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Aerial Surveillance By Helicopter 
Not Barred By 
Fourth Amendment 
A sharply divided United States 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether helicopter surveillance of a back-
yard greenhouse from an altitude of 400 
feet constitutes a "search" within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution requiring a 
search warrant. Justice White, in writing 
for a four member plurality of the Court, 
held that no violation of the fourth amend-
ment occurred ~hen, from their vantage 
in a helicopter, police observed marijuana 
plants growing in a partially covered 
greenhouse. 
The case, Florida 'V. Riley, I originated 
from a rural area of Pasco County, 
Florida, which provided the setting for a 
residential mobile home. The Pasco Coun-
ty Sheriffs Office received an anonymous 
tip that marijuana plants were growing on 
the property which was occupied by 
Michael Riley. Unable to observe any con-
traband from the road, a deputy flew over 
the property in a helicopter and circled 
twice at 400 feet. Construction of the 
greenhouse permitted the deputy to easily 
identify marijuana plants inside. The struc-
ture, located ten to twenty feet behind the 
residence, was casually constructed· of ()-
paque material. Only two sides of the 
greenhouse were enclosed. The other two 
sides were completely open, although not 
visible from the road or surrounding prop-
erty. Two full panels, approximately ten 
percent of the roof area. were open to view 
from above. A wire fence surrounded the 
five acres of property and visitors were 
by Paul J. Marino, Esq. and 
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greeted with a "DO NOT ENTER" sign 
posted at the entrance. The deputy ob-
tained a search warrant for the greenhouse 
based upon his visual identification of the 
marijuana plants, and, upon its execution, 
forty-four marijuana plants were seized. 
Riley moved to suppress the evidence on 
the ground that the police activity prior to 
obtaining a search warrant constituted a 
"search" infringing upon his expectation 
of privacy in the greenhouse. The trial 
judge agreed and granted his motion to 
suppress. The State of Florida was success-
ful in its appeal to the Second District 
Court of Appeal which reversed the trial 
court.2 However, upon subsequent review, 
the Florida Supreme Court reinstated the 
trial court's suppression of the evidence.3 
The Florida court found that Riley exhi-
bited a reasonable expectation of privacy 
entitled to fourth amendment protection 
and distinguished Riley from recent 
United States Supreme Court decisions 
dealing with aerial surveillance. 
In one of those cases, California 'V. 
Ciraolo,4 police flew over a residence in a 
fixed wing plane at a height of 1,000 feet to 
confirm an anonymous tip that marijuana 
was growing in the backyard. The 
Supreme Court first determined that the 
backyard was within the curtilage of the 
residence and then focused upon whether 
the observation of the curtilage by the 
police from the aircraft violated the resi-
dent's expectation of privacy. The Court 
decided that any expectation of privacy the 
occupant might have in his backyard was 
not reasonable and not one which society 
was prepared to recognize.5 The surveil-
lance was acceptable where: 
The observations ... took place within 
public navigable airspace ... in a phy-
sically nonintrusive manner; from this 
point [the police] were able to observe 
plants readily discernible to the naked 
eye as marijuana ... . Any member of 
the public flying in this airspace who 
glanced down could have seen everything 
that these offICers observed. On this 
record, we readily conclude that 
respondent's expectation that his 
garden was protected from such obser-
vation is unreasonable and is not an 
expectation that society is prepared to 
honor.6 
In Dow Chern. Co. 'V. United States,? the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
was investigating the Dow Chemical Com-
pany for possible violations of the Clean 
Air Act. After having been denied a 
request for an on-site inspection, the EPA 
obtained aerial photographs of the plant 
from an aircraft flying in public navigable 
airspace. Dow Chemical alleged that the 
photographs taken by the EPA amounted 
to a search without a warrant in violation 
of the fourth amendment. The Supreme 
Court refused to extend protection of the 
fourth amendment to the industrial plant 
because the plant was not curtilage and the 
photographs were taken from public navi-
gable airspace, stating: 
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We conclude that the open areas of an 
industrial plant complex ... are not 
analogous to the "curtilage" of a dwel-
ling for purposes of aerial surveillance; 
such an industrial complex is more 
comparable to an open field and as 
such it is open to the view and observa-
tion of persons in aircraft lawfully in 
the public airspace immediately above 
or sufficiently near the area for the 
reach of cameras.B 
Based upon the facts present in Riley and 
the principles announced in Ciraolo, the 
Florida Supreme Court readily determined 
that Riley's greenhouse was part of the 
curtilage .. However, the Florida court 
refused to apply any other principles in 
Ciraolo or Dow Chemical to Riley. The 
court distinguished the Riley aerial surveil-
lance from that in Ciraolo on the grounds 
that Riley involved a helicopter flying at 
400 feet rather than a fixed wing aircraft 
flying at an altitude of 1,000 feet. The 
court feared that helicopter surveillance 
presented a greater threat to privacy and 
was more likely to be subject to abuse. The 
court reasoned, "Surveillance by helicop-
ter is particularly likely to unreasonably 
intrude upon private activities ... because 
of a helicopter's virtually unlimited 
maneuverability and observational 
capabilities, helicopter surveillance poses a 
serious risk to privacy."9 
When presented with the issue of heli-
copter surveillance in Riley, the United 
States Supreme Court held that their 
decision in Ciraolo was controlling. By 
knowingly exposing the contents of the 
greenhouse to public view, Riley waived 
any fourth amendment protection. Since a 
portion of the roof and sides of the 
greenhouse were exposed to public view 
from the air, the Court held that Riley 
could not reasonably have expected the 
contents of the greenhouse to be shielded 
from view by police who were flying in a 
helicopter where they had a right to be. 
That which is knowingly exposed cannot 
reasonably be expected to remain private. 
A plurality of the Court based their 
decision on the fact that the helicopter was 
not violating any law or regulation by fly-
ing at an altitude of 400 feet over Riley's 
property. The Court relied heavily upon 
federal rules and regulations which require 
that aircraft must at all times maintain an 
altitude which allows for emergency land-
ing without undue hazard to persons or 
property on the surface in the event of a 
power failure. lo The regulations further 
establish certain minimum altitudes for 
fixed winged aircraft of 1,000 feet above 
the highest ground obstacle in congested 
areas, II or in other than congested areas, an 
altitude of 500 feet above the surface, 
except over water or sparsely populated 
areas.12 Helicopters are exempt from 
either of the two federally regulated mini-
mum flight altitudes that must be main-
tained by fixed winged aircraft. I) Given 
the unique characteristic of a helicopter to 
perform "autorotation" to safely land the 
aircraft in the event of a power failure, 
such maneuver can be accomplished at 
almost any altitude without danger to per-
sons or property below, provided the air-
craft has sufficient forward air speed. 14 
The extent of the Riley decision is not 
unlimited. The Court cautioned that: 
We would have a different case if fly-
ing at that altitude had been contrary 
to law or regulation. But helicopters 
are not bound by the lower limits of 
the navigable airspace allowed to other 
aircraft. Any member of the public 
could legally have been flying over 
Riley's property in a helicopter at the 
altitude of 400 feet and could have 
observed Riley's greenhouse. The 
police officer did no more. This is not 
to say that an inspection of the cur-
tilage of a house from an aircraft will 
always pass muster under the fourth 
amendment simply because the plane 
is within the navigable airspace speci-
fied by lawY 





to privacy . .. " 
The decision is tempered by the facts 
that the helicopter was not violating the 
law, that helicopter flight at 400 feet is not 
a rare occurrence, that there is no evidence 
that the helicopter interfered with the nor-
mal use of the residence or greenhouse, 
and that there was no undue noise, wind, 
dust, or threat of injury. A case involving 
any of these factors could result in a find-
ing of a constitutional infringement of a 
person's expectation of privacy. 
Justice O'Connor, who concurred in the 
judgment reversing the Florida Supreme 
Court, wrote a separate opinion and speci-
fically observed that "the plurality's 
approach rests the scope of fourth amend-
ment protection too heavily on compli-
ance with FAA regulations whose purpose 
is to promote air safety not to protect 
'(t)he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.' (U.S. Const. amend. IV)."16 Justice 
O'Connor expanded on her reasoning to 
the extent that merely U[b]ecause the FAA 
has decided that helicopters can lawfully 
operate at virtually any altitude so long as 
they pose no safety hazard, it does not fol-
low that the expectations of privacy socie-
ty is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable' 
simply mirror the FAA's safety con-
cerns."17 
Both the plurality Court and Justice 
O'Connor appeared to have left open the 
door to review future cases involving heli-
copter observation. Justice O'Connor 
noted, U[t]he fact that a helicopter could 
conceivably observe the curtilage at virtu-
ally any altitude or angle, without violat-
ing FAA regulation, does not in itself 
mean that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy from such observa-
tion."IB 
Justice O'Connor's final expression of 
concern regarding the holding in this case 
was based on a recognition that a person's 
expectation of curtilage protection from 
naked eye aerial observation was not 
unreasonable, per se. In "sufficiently rare" 
cases police surveillance from helicopters 
from lower altitudes could violate a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy despite 
compliance with FAA air safety regula-
tions. 
The dissenters in this case, Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun (in 
a separate dissenting opinion) appeared to 
express near disbelief in the legal analysis 
of the plurality Court on the helicopter 
observation issue. The dissenting Justices 
summed up their concerns regarding the 
majority decision with a comparison to 
George Orwell's dread version of life in 
the 1980's: 
The black-mustachio'd face gazed 
down from every commanding corner. 
There was one on the house front 
immediately opposite. BIG BROTH-
ER IS WATCHING YOU, the cap-
tion said .... In the far distance a 
helicopter skimmed down between the 
roofs, hovered for an instant like a 
bluebottle, and darted away again, 
with a curving flight. It was the Police 
Patrol, snooping into people's win-
dows. 19 
1984 has come and passed. The surveil-
lance conducted in Riley is hardly the 
"snooping" feared by Orwell. The dissent 
leaves unanswered a simple but critical 
question posed to law enforcement: What, 
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if anything, should police do if confronted 
head-on by evidence of a crime when they 
are in a place where they have as much 
right to be as any other citizen? The major-
ity recognizes that police need not ignore 
what they see from the public realm. 
CONCLUSION 
The impact of the Riley decision is 
bound to be far-reaching. It authorizes law 
enforcement officers to gather and utilize 
information gained through advanced 
technological surveillance techniques 
without the necessity of a search warrant. 
However, that ability is limited to the 
police gaining the information from a pub-
lic vantage point where they have a right 
to be and gathering evidence in a nonintru-
sive manner. But, as Justice O'Connor 
remarked, "[p]ublic roads, even those less 
traveled by, are clearly demarked public 
thoroughfares."20 And now, aerial surveil-
lance by helicopter, if conducted from a 
public thoroughfare, is permissible even 
though it is still the road less traveled. 
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